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Abstract 
The results of a study of major safety aspects of the use of natural gas as fuel for automobiles are presented. First the risks 
involved in the parking of CNG automobiles (Compressed Natural Gas) in underground parking lots are identified and a 
comparison is made with the risks connected with gasoline and LPG driven cars. In the second part of the paper the risks of a so-
called “slow fill” compression device with which a CNG tank can be filled at home is analyzed. 
© 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
The first country in which natural gas (NG) as fuel for the propulsion of road vehicles was successful was Italy 
and was connected with the discovery locally of natural gas about 1950. In the last decade the number of NG 
vehicles has risen to over a million in several countries  around the globe. One reason for this evolution is economic: 
in many countries NG is considerably less expensive than conventional fuels such as gasoline and diesel. The other 
advantage is the fact that natural gas burns in a cleaner, less polluting way. 
In Table 1 the main properties of methane (the major component of natural gas), propane (component of 
Liquefied Petroleum Gas – LPG) and gasoline are listed. At standard atmospheric conditions, methane as well as 
propane are gasses. Methane however is considerably lighter than air, while propane is heavier than air. Gasoline is 
liquid but it gives rise to vapors which are heavier than air and which are flammable even at very low concentrations 
in air. It is obvious that all of these fuels pose a safety hazard. 
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Table 1. Properties of fuels. 
 Methane Propane Gasoline 
Atmospheric boiling point (°C)   -162 -42 47 - 205 
Vapor pressure at 20°C (bar)    0,13 8,5 0,5 
Liquid density relative to water at 1 atm, 20°C   0,45 0,58 0,70 
Vapor density relative to air at 1 atm, 20°C 0,6 1,5 3 – 4 
Auto ignition temperature (°C) 530 432 228 – 470 
Flash point (°C)   -45 – -20 
Flammability limits of vapor (vol %)   4,5 – 16,5 2,2 – 9,5 1,0 – 7,6 
Heating value (MJ/kg) 55 50 59 
 
 
LPG (propane) is used in cars at pressures of some 9 bar at which it is liquid and thus requires little tank volume. 
NG is compressed to some 200 bar to make the tank volume sufficiently small . This pressure aspect also presents a 
safety hazard. Gasoline and diesel tanks do not suffer from this drawback.  
The rapid development of NG cars has generated some concerns within government authorities responsible for 
public saty. On the one side there is concern about the safety of CNG cars parked in semi enclosed (eg underground) 
parking facilities and on the other hand the safety of domestic CNG filling systems. 
 Figure 1 gives a schematic picture of a CNG system. Only two gas tanks are present in CNG cars. There are four 
different types of CNG tanks. All types are subjected to rigorous testing and have to satisfy strict safety requirements 
(mechanical impact, bonfire test, overpressure resistance…). Each tank is provided with a safety device which 
releases the contents of the tank when the tank temperature rises above 110°C. All tanks are provided with magnetic 
valves which close when the current to the valves is interrupted (shut down of the system).  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. CNG fuel system. 
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2. CNG cars in enclosed car parking buildings 
The safety risks of CNG cars are compared here with the risks of gasoline and LPG cars when they are parked in 
enclosed (underground) parking buildings. In the context of this study, one understands by “safety risks” the 
probability of persons to be killed by the effects of an accident. 
The effects of accidents involving the release of fuel depend upon the type of fuel, its quantity released and its 
pressure. These parameters are listed in table 2 for the car types considered. 
It should be noted that a CNG tank is filled with gas while an LPG tank is filled with gas and liquid in 
thermodynamic equilibrium. 
 
                               Table 2. Fuel parameters for a typical car. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While in a car park a fuel release may occur due to a mechanical failure leading to a rupture, or a leak of the fuel 
system of the car. A rupture may also be caused by heat from a nearby car on fire or a fire of the car in question. The 
scenario’s which then may follow are dependent upon the type of fuel. 
 
2.1. Accident scenarios 
 
(1) CNG 
A leaking CNG tank will give rise to a gas jet which becomes combustible when the gas mixes with the air of 
the environment. When ignited, the gas jet turns into a jet fire. The rupture of a CNG tank will result in a physical 
explosion characterized by a blast wave if the natural gas released is not ignited. If the gas is ignited at the time of 
release one will experience a gas explosion. If the ignition of the gas is delayed a gas cloud fire will occur. 
(2) LPG 
A leaking LPG tank will give rise to a gas jet if the leak is on the gas side of the tank. In case the leak occurs on 
the liquid part of the tank, a two-phase (gas-liquid) jet will occur. A two-phase leak will give rise to a gas jet and a 
liquid pool of fuel on the ground. When ignition occurs at the start of the leak a jet fire will occur. The gas phase 
may give rise to a cloud fire when the ignition is delayed. In addition a pool fire may occur. A rupturing LPG tank 
will give rise to a mixture of gas and superheated liquid fuel which rapidly vaporizes (flashes) and expands. This is 
called a Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion (BLEVE). It is characterized by a blast wave. In addition a 
liquid pool will be formed from the part of the liquid LPG that is released and did not evaporate before reaching the 
ground.  When ignition occurs at the moment of rupture a gas explosion will be the result. 
(3) Gasoline 
Overpressure of a gasoline tank may occur when the tank is heated by a nearby fire (car fire) or the fire of the 
car of which the tank is a component. In such a case ignition of the gasoline released, resulting in a fire ball has to 
be assumed. A leaking gasoline tank will give rise to a liquid pool. The vapors are combustible and, when ignited 
will result in a pool fire. The combustible vapor layer on top of the liquid pool is so thin however that it will not 
give rise to an explosion when ignited. The vapors may extend a considerable distance from the pool due to air 
movement over the pool. When ignited, such vapors will give rise to flash fires. 
2.2. Accident effects 
2.2.1. CNG 
(1) Jet fire 
Table 3 lists the flow rate of natural gas as a function of the leak diameter assuming a constant tank pressure of 
200 bar. The natural gas will mix with the air and will produce jets which are partially flammable. To give an 
                                                                CNG                               LPG         Gasoline 
total tank volume (liter)                           50 
volume single tank  (kg)                             8 
pressure (bar)                                          200 
70             50 
35             35 
   8               1 
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impression of the size of these jets the location where the lower (LEL) and the upper flammability limit (UEL) is 
reached in the jet is plotted in figure 2 for a very small leak ( 1 mm diameter) and in figure 3 for a leak of 5mm 
diameter. When the tank safety device opens a release opening of some 5mm is created. 
                                Table 3. Outflow from a 200 bar CNG tank. 
  Leak diameter(mm)     Flow rate(kg/s)         Flow rate ( m3/s)       Duration outflow (s)             
            1                             0,027                               0, 038                  1890   
            2                             0,108                               0,155                   470  
            5                             0,680                               0,971                    75 
          10                             2,718                                3,88                     17,5 
 
 
 
    
    
                 Fig. 2. CNG jet from 1mm leak (m) .                                                                      Fig. 3. CNG jet from 5mm leak .    
The release of gas will lead to a decreasing tank pressure as is shown in figure 4 for a tank of 50 liter and a leak 
diameter of 5mm. This in turn leads to a decreasing length of the gas jet as shown in figure 5. Table 3 lists the time 
necessary to reduce the tank pressure to 1,1 bar for a 50 liter tank. 
 
Flow rate ( kg/s) 
 
            
 
        
Fig. 4. Flow rate evolution during a gas leak.                                         Fig. 5. Flammable jet length evolution during a gas leak. 
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When a jet is ignited a jet flame occurs. Table 4 gives the dimensions of the flame when the tank pressure is 200 
bar and the outflow is horizontal. In this table also the distance from the flame where the heat radiation is 10 kW/m2 
is listed. At such high radiation level people can suffer severe burns resulting in death. 
 
Table 4. Flame dimensions from a leak at 200 bar. 
Leak diameter  (mm)     Flame length(m)     Max flame width (m)    Distance to 10   kW/m2 (m)       
             1                            2,5                            0,2                                        3 
             2                            4,5                            0,5                                        5 
             5                           10,0                           1,5                                      12 
           10                           18,2                            3,1                                     24 
 
Fig. 6 shows the evolution of the length of the jet flame from a 5 mm diameter leak. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6. Jet flame length evolution. 
 
(2) Cloud fire 
The calculations above assume that the outflow of gas is in the shape of a free jet. The mass of combustible gas in 
the jet is very limited and insufficient to give rise to an explosion when ignited. Accumulation of gas is possible 
however when the jet expansion is hindered due to the presence of obstacles. Also in this case the size of such gas 
clouds is too small to give rise to explosions. Also in case of a large leak and even a tank rupture the amount of 
combustible gas formed is too small to give rise to dangerous pressure build up after ignition in a parking building 
[1]. Cloud fires with volumes of some 10m3 are possible however. 
(3) Blast wave 
The sudden rupture of a 50 liter tank at 200 bar will result in a blast wave. The strength of the wave can be 
calculated by means of correlations such as presented in ref [2]. It is found that the blast wave results in 0,1 bar 
overpressure at a distance of 10m.Overpressures of 0,1bar and higher may cause lethal effects on people. 
(4) Gas explosion 
When, during rupture, the gas is ignited, a gas explosion may occur. The pressure wave generated by the gas 
explosion of a 50 liter tank can give rise to an overpressure of 0,1 bar at a distance of 13m from the tank. 
 
2.2.2. LPG 
(1) Jet fire 
A leaking LPG tank can give rise to a single phase outflow of liquid or gas LPG but also to a two-phase mixture 
of gas and liquid. Ignition will always result in a jet fire. Due to the lower pressure of an LPG tank the gas outflow 
rate will be smaller than in the case of a CNG tank. E.g. a 5 mm hole will result in 0,05 kg of LPG gas leaving the 
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tank. Also due to the larger contents of an LPG tank, the duration of the outflow will be much larger than with a 
CNG tank. The LPG jet fires will be shorter than the CNG jets, for the same hole size. 
(2)Cloud fire 
Cloud fires resulting from an LPG gas leak are of limited size and will not give rise to lethal overpressures. If the 
outflow from the tank is liquid however, the mass flow rate may be sufficiently high to result in large clouds (100 
m3) that, upon ignition may give rise to gas explosions. A tank rupture will result in flashing of the liquid LPG. 
Some 27% of the liquid will vaporize. This results in a gas volume of 93m3. When this amount of gas is mixed with 
air and ignited a gas explosion may occur. 
(3)Pool fire 
A rupturing LPG tank of 70 liter gross volume will release 41 liters of liquid LPG. The characteristics of the 
pool formed on the ground are listed in table 5 as a function of pool depth.  
 
               Table 5. LPG pool characteristics. 
Pool depth(mm)   Surface area(m2)   Pool diameter (m)      Fire duration  (s)     Flame height  (m)    Evaporation time (s)    
         1                        41                        7,2                              7,7                               23,8                       0,8 
         2                       20,5                      5,1                             15,4                             20,1                        3,2 
         5                       8,2                        3,2                             38,5                             14,2                         20 
       10                       4,1                        2,3                               77                              10,9                        81 
 
The duration of the fire is calculated based upon a rate of combustion of 0,13 kg/s m2. The flame height is 
calculated by means of the correlations of ref [3]. At a distance of one pool diameter the heat radiation can give rise 
to lethal burns. The temperature of the flashed liquid is very low. The liquid evaporates very quickly as shown by 
the last column of table 5. 
(4) BLEVE 
If a typical LPG tank ruptures suddenly at normal operating pressure, a boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion 
will occur with overpressures of 0,1 bar at 10m from the tank. If the rupture occurs due to overheating of the tank 
this distance increases to 13m. 
(5) Gas explosion 
Sudden tank rupture and simultaneous ignition of the LPG may result in a strong gas explosion. For a tank with 
35 kg of LPG people can be lethally wounded up to distances of the order of 23 m from the tank. 
 
2.2.3. Gasoline 
Table 6 lists the leak flow rate for a gasoline tank at a liquid level 20 cm above the leak. The flow rates are much 
lower than these of a CNG tank. Gasoline tanks also contain more fuel (35 kg) than a CNG tank (8 kg). This 
explains why gasoline tanks require more time to empty than CNG tanks.  
 
Table 6. Gasoline tank leak rates. 
Leak diameter (mm)    Flow rate(kg/s)         Duration outflow(s)            
             1                           0,0017                      6.350 
             2                           0,0068                      1.588 
             5                             0,042                        255 
           10                              0,170                       63,5 
 
(1)Pool fire 
The characteristics of a pool fire of a pool of 50 liter gasoline are listed in table 7. The calculations are based 
upon a combustion rate of 0,055 kg/s m2 [3]. Lethal radiation doses occur up to a distance of half a radius from the 
pool boundary. The flames are less high than those of LPG fires 
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Table 7.  Characteristics of a gasoline pool fire. 
Pool depth(mm)    Surface area (m2)      Pool diameter(m)   Duration fire(s)       Flame height(m)   Evaporation time(s)       
       1                              50                             7,9                          13                               17                      103 
       2                              25                             5,6                          26                               5,7                     206 
       5                             10                              3,6                          67                                2,5                     515 
     10                               5                              2,5                        134                                0,5                    1030 
 
(2)Flash fire 
Table 7 shows the time necessary for a pool to evaporate. The evaporation rate was determine by means of ref [3] 
and amounts to 6,8 g/s m2. The gasoline vapors generated disperse into the environment. Of considerable 
importance in this respect is the speed of the air over the pool. The distances which the vapors have to travel in order 
to be diluted to the lower flammability concentration were calculated for three different pool sizes and three 
different wind speeds [2]. The results are shown in table 8. The distances are relative to the centre of the pools. The 
longitudinal distances are in the downwind direction. The transverse distances are at 90° angle to the wind direction. 
It is clear that combustible vapor-air mixtures can exist far from the pool. These vapor layers are rather thin (less 
than a meter thick), but when they are ignited will give rise to flash fires and serious burns to people present in the 
vapor layer. 
 
Table 8. Dispersion distances of gasoline vapors 
Pool area(m2)     Pool diameter (m)      Wind  speed  (m/s)     LEL longitudinal (m)      LEL transverse   (m)       
 
     50                      7,9 
 
0,1 
0,5 
1,0 
      76,6 
      88,5 
      86,9 
  53,4 
  26,9 
  13,4 
 
     25                      5,6 
0,1 
0,5 
1,0 
      48,2 
      60,5 
       9,9 
  56,2 
  16,8 
   9,5 
 
     10                      3,6 
 
0,1 
0,5 
1,0 
      27,4 
      38,9 
      39,6 
  20,5 
  9,4 
  5,8 
 
(3) Fire ball 
A gasoline tank is not able to withstand high temperatures and pressures. A tank submitted to high influx of heat 
(due to a near fire) may brake and release its contents, creating a fire ball. In [4] it is shown that a fire ball from a 50 
liter gasoline tank can have lethal effects up to a distance of 15 m from the tank.  
 
2.3. Risk evaluation 
To evaluate the risks of the different types of cars in an enclosed parking building event trees were developed 
which are shown in figures 7, 8 and 9. By means of these trees the probability of occurrence of the various events 
analyzed above can be calculated. 
     The probabilities involved in the initiating events are mainly obtained from reference 5 and are listed in table 9. 
The probability of a car getting on fire while in the car park is derived from the study of ref [6]. NA means “not 
applicable”. 
The overfilling of a tank poses a serious safety problem for LPG tanks. A temperature rise of the tank leads to 
expansion of the liquid phase. If the tank is overfilled this may lead to tank rupture. The probability for this to 
happen while the car is parked was estimated. 
LPG and CNG tanks are provided with pressure relief devices. The probability of spurious opening and the 
probability of not opening while required were taken into account. The faulty opening of a PRD is treated here as a 
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leak. 
 
Initiating event PRD opens Direct ignition Delayed ignition Final event 
 
leak 
 
 
NA 
yes  jet fire 
no yes cloud fire, jet fire 
no no no safety concern 
 
rupture 
 
NA 
yes  explosionor 
no yes cloud fire 
 no blast wave 
 
fire 
yes yes  jet fire 
no yes  explosion 
 
Fig. 7. Event tree CNG car. 
 
 
Initiating 
event 
PRD opens Direct ignition Delayed ignition Final event 
 
leak 
 
NA 
yes  jet fire 
no yes cloud fire or explosion, pool fire 
 no no safety concern 
 
 
rupture 
 
 
NA 
yes  BLEVE, fire ball 
no no BLEVE, cloud fire or explosion 
no no BLEVE 
 
fire 
yes yes  jet fire, pool fire 
no yes  BLEVE, fire ball 
 
 
overfilling 
 
 
yes 
yes  jet fire 
no yes cloud fire 
no no no safety concern 
 
no 
yes  BLEVE, fire ball 
no yes explosion or cloud fire, BLEVE 
no no blast wave 
 
Fig. 8. Event tree for an LPG car.  
 
Initiating event Direct ignition Delayed ignition Final event 
 
tank leak 
 
yes  pool fire 
no yes cloud fire, pool fire 
no no no safety concern 
 
tank rupture 
yes  fire ball, pool fire 
no yes flash fire, pool fire 
no no no safety concern 
fire yes  fire ball, pool fire 
 
Fig 9. Event tree for a gasoline car 
 
Table 9. Probabilities. 
        Event                                   Probability (per year or event)          
direct ignition leak                        0,05 
direct ignition rupture                   0,005 
direct ignition by fire                    1 
delayed ignition                            0,5 
leak                                               1,68 E-6 
rupture                                          1,14 E-10 
fire                                                1,7 E-7 
LPG tank overfilling                    1,32 E-3 
spurious opening PRD                 2,2 E-3 
PRD not opening                          2.2 E-3 
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The probability study leads to the total probability of occurrence of final life threatening events as listed in 
table 10. 
 
Table 10. Total probability of occurrence. 
 CNG LPG GASOLINE 
Jet fire 1,06 E-6 6,6 E-5 0 
Pool fire 0 9,7 E-7 1,1 E-6 
Cloud fire 8,0 E-7 6,4 E-5 8,0 E-7 
Gas explosion 3,72 E-10 2,2 E-6 0 
Blast wave 5,7 E-11 0 0 
Fire ball 0 1,4 E-8 1,7 E-7 
BLEVE 0 1,4 E-6 0 
 
2.4. Conclusions 
It should be concluded that CNG cars may give rise to more accident scenarios than gasoline cars. However 
several of these scenarios are characterized by a very low probability of occurrence. In total CNG cars when parked 
in closed parking buildings do not pose a greater safety risk than gasoline cars. LPG cars on the other hand show the 
potential for the most scenarios some of which have the highest probabilities of occurrence. 
 
3. CNG filling installation 
 
CNG filling installations are on the market with which CNG cars can be filled from the domestic natural gas grid. 
The question put forward is whether such installations are safe to be used as household appliances and in particular 
if they can safely be placed and operated in the closed parking garage of a home.  
Fig. 10 shows a wall mounted version of the device. It consists mainly of a three stage compressor with coolers 
after each compression stage (Fig.11). 
 
 
 
Fig 10. Wall mounted CNG slow fill.                                     Fig 11. Three stage CNG compressor [7] ;1 suction;  
                                                                                                          2 outlet; 3, 4, 5 compression stages; 6  intercoolers 
 
1
2
3
6 4 
5 
6 6 
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Domestic CNG filling installations are limited in capacity and typically require 6 to 8 hours of operation to fill 
the tank of a CNG car. For this reason they are often called “slow fill” installations. This means that they operate 
often (e.g. at night) when there is no supervision.  
 
3.1. Accident scenarios 
 
The whole filling system consists of a low pressure (LP) part extending from the connection with the gas grid to 
the compressor and a high pressure (HP) side from the compressor to the gas tank of the car. The accident initiating 
events considered are: 
HP leak 
HP rupture. 
LP leak or rupture 
The LP part of the installation consists of piping only. For this reason LP ruptures are treated as large diameter 
leaks in this study.  
When after an initial event the gas is ignited, a jet fire, a cloud fire or a gas explosion will occur. 
 
3.2. Accident effects 
 
(1) HP leak 
The flow rate from a leak at 200 bar is listed in table 3 above. It is important to note that high pressure is present 
only when the compressor is running and that the typical capacity of a slow fill compressor is 1,5 Nm3/h. This is 
much smaller than the flow rates listed in table 3. When a HP leak occurs the compressor outlet pressure will drop 
very fast and the leak rate will be reduced to 1,5 Nm3/h. The car is provided by a non-return valve. 
For this reason HP leaks release 1,5 Nm3 of gas per hour in the garage. The lengths of the combustible jets 
generated by this flow rate are listed in table 11. 
 
Table 11. Combustible gas jets HP rupture. 
Leak diameter (mm)       Distance to LEL  (mm)        
        1                                          76      
        2                                        152  
        5                                        380 
      10                                        760 
 
It is clear that these jets are rather short. 
The gas enters the garage and may give rise to gas buildup such that combustible gas-air mixtures are formed 
inside the garage. The air inside garages is refreshed due to ventilation through openings along doors, windows etc. 
The typical ventilation rate of a garage is 1 garage volume per hour. The effect of the ventilation rate on the long 
term average gas concentration in the garage is shown in table 12 . 
  
Table 12. Effect of ventilation rate on gas concentration. 
Ventilation rate(garage vol./h)       Final gas conc. (%)       Time to 90% final conc. (h)                       
0,5 
1,0 
1,5 
2,0 
                     5 
                  2,5 
                  1,7 
                   1,2 
4,06 
2,03 
1,35 
1,01 
 
Higher ventilation rates lead to lower final concentration and shorter periods to reach the final concentration. 
(2) HP rupture 
Whether a rupture or a leak occurs, the gas flow rate will decrease to the nominal flow rate of the compressor, as 
explained above. The results of the previous section therefore remain applicable. To simulate a rupture, the results 
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for a 10 mm leak can be applied as the HP filling line typically has this diameter. 
(3)LP leaks and ruptures 
The LP side of a slow fill installation is at the pressure of the natural gas network in the home. This is typically 
25 mbar. Table 13 shows the flow rates, the final concentration and the time to reach 90% of the final concentration 
as a function of the hole size. The ventilation rate is assumed to be 1 garage volume per hour. The garage has a 
volume of 60 m3. 
 
               Table 13. Concentration in garage, leak at 25 mbar 
Diameter leak(mm)      Flow rate (g/s)         Flow rate  (Nm3/h)        Final conc. (%)          Time to 90% final conc. (h)         
           1                             0,019                               0,11                          0,18                                  2,03 
           2                             0,076                               0,44                          0,72                                  2,03 
           5                             0,48                                 2,75                          4,38                                  2,10 
         10                             1,9                                   11                             16,4                                   2,20 
 
Figs. 12 to 15 show the effect of the hole size and the ventilation rate on the evolution of the average gas 
concentration in a garage of 60 m3. 
 
Fig. 12. Evolution average gas concentration,                                                 Fig 13. Evolution average gas concentration,  
leak diam. 5 mm, vent rate 1.                                                                           leak diam. 5 mm,   vent rate 0,5. 
                                                               
 
   Fig. 14. Evolution average gas concentration,                                                               Fig. 15. Evolution average gas concentration, 
    leak diam 10 mm; Vent rate 1.                                                                                       leak diam 10 mm; vent rate 0,5. 
 
The results of figures 12 to 15 are obtained by assuming that the gas concentration in the garage is uniform. 
Natural gas however is much lighter than air (relative density 0,6). The gas will tend to move towards the ceiling of 
the garage where it may accumulate and still create flammable mixtures with air although the average concentration 
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is below the LEL. 
The flow of natural gas through a ventilated garage was investigated by means of FLUENT, a computational 
fluid mechanics software package. Fig. 16 shows the garage. The dimensions are in meter. The car is represented by 
the grey structure. In this figure the LEL contour is shown of a leak at 1,5 m above the ground, and at the center of 
the wall on the right hand side. The gas flow rate is 2,75 Nm3/h. This is the flow rate of a leak of 5 mm in the LP 
side of the installation. It is assumed that the ventilation rate of the garage is 60 m3/h (one garage volume per hour). 
It is assumed that the ventilation occurs through rectangular openings at the bottom of the walls in front and behind 
the car. The height of these openings is 30 cm.  
It Is clear from Fig. 16 that after 215 s LEL concentrations occur only near the location of the leak. In the 
vertical direction the gas concentration increases (Fig. 17). 
Fig. 18 shows how the gas layer near the ceiling grows and becomes richer in natural gas. After 3000 s the gas 
concentration has reached 7% at the ceiling while at ground level the concentration is only 1%! Figs. 20 and 21 
show how the plane where the gas concentration is equal to the LEL travels downward between 2300 and 3000 s. 
 
 
 
                 Fig 16. LEL location after 215 s.                                                  Fig. 17. Gas concentration in a vertical section after 215 s. 
                                                                                 
    
 
Fig. 18. Gas concentration distribution after 1370 s.                           Fig.19. Gas concentration distribution after 3000 s. 
 
It should be pointed out that the calculation based upon the assumption of uniform gas concentration (average 
gas concentration) the gas concentration should never reach the LEL (see Fig. 12). It is clear that this assumption is 
not realistic.  
The location of the ventilating openings is of vital importance. This is demonstrated by figures 22,23 and 24 
which show the concentration distribution after 3600 s for the three remaining combinations of inlet and outlet 
opening locations. 
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Fig 20. Location of the LEL plane after 2300 s.                                                  Fig. 21. Location of the LEL plane after 3000 s. 
 
 
 
Fig 22. Gas concentration central section, ventilation: inlet at ground level, outlet at ceiling. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 23. Gas concentration central section, ventilation: inlet at ceiling, outlet at ground level. 
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Fig. 24. Gas concentration central section, inlet at ceiling, outlet at ceiling. 
 
3.3. Conclusions 
 
Slow fill installations can give rise to dangerous conditions when placed in enclosed garages. The fact that they 
operate long periods at a time requires special safety measures. In general one cannot rely on natural ventilation of 
the garage to avoid flammable gas-air mixtures in case of gas leaks. Gas detection systems with automatic shut off 
of the gas inlet and stopping the slow fill installation are necessary to achieve an acceptable level of safety. To 
operate the installation in the open air is an acceptable alternative. 
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